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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a Member State of the EU
may revoke its notice to withdraw from the Union under art.50 TEU. The answer
to this question has significant practical implications for Brexit, both domestically
and across Europe. While the reversibility of the British withdrawal notification
has taken centre stage in the debate on Brexit, the matter has not been assessed
in depth. The present paper suggests that interpreting art.50 TEU with reference
to art.31 and art.32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permits a
more systematic analysis of the subject than what has been offered so far by
commentators and the English courts. Based on this analytical framework, the
paper reviews the text and context of art.50 TEU, the general scheme of the
Treaties, other rules of international law and the relevant preparatory work. All
of these elements point in a single direction. Contrary to the position taken by
the English courts in Miller, they confirm that a notice to withdraw issued under
art.50 TEU is in fact reversible. In the light of these findings, it would be perfectly
appropriate for national courts in other Member States, except those against
whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law, to decide that an
art.50 TEU notification is revocable without referring the matter to the Court of
Justice. However, as only the Court of Justice can provide an authoritative
interpretation of art.50 TEU applicable across all Member States, it would be
more appropriate, in the interests of legal certainty, if they were to submit this
question to the Court of Justice under the preliminary ruling procedure.
 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter (A.Sari@exeter.ac.uk). All views are expressed in a personal
capacity. Many thanks to Timon Hughes-Davies and the editors for their comments.
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Introduction
Can a Member State in the process of withdrawing from the EU in accordance with art.50 TEU
change its mind before the withdrawal takes effect? This question has shot to prominence in the
aftermath of the British referendum to leave the EU. The text of art.50 TEU does not address the
point in express terms and opinion remains divided on the matter. According to Donald Tusk, the
President of the European Council, “there are no legal barriers” that would prevent the UK from
unilaterally revoking its withdrawal notification under art.50 TEU.1 This assessment is shared by
the EU Select Committee of the House of Lords2 and a substantial number of commentators.3 By
contrast, in the case of Miller,4 the parties were united in their submissions that a Member State
does not have the power to revoke its notification to leave the EU. Appearing on behalf of the
lead claimant, Lord Pannick QC boldly declared in the High Court that “there is no going back”
once a withdrawal notification has been issued.5 He was joined in this view by the Attorney
1. D. Tusk, Keynote Address at the European Policy Center 20th Anniversary Conference, Reference I-
127730 (13 October 2017) http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I127730# [Accessed 15 March
2017].
2. House of Lords EU Committee, The Process of Withdrawing from the European Union, Session 2015–16, HL
Paper 138 (4 May 2016), pp.4–5.
3. E.g. P. Craig, “Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts” (2016) 41 E.L. Rev. 447, pp.464–465; T. Tridimas, “Article
50: An Endgame without an End?” (2016) 27 King’s Law Journal 297, pp.303–305; A. Thiele, “Der Austritt aus der EU:
Hintergründe und rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen eines ‘Brexit’” (2016) 51 Europarecht 281, p.295; A. Wyrozumska,
“Article 50”, in H.-J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (Eds.), The Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer,
2013), p.1410. See also P. Eeckhout and E. Frantziou, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading” UCL
European Institute Working Paper (10 December 2016), pp.37–40, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/ei-
publications/brexit-article-50.pdf [Accessed 15 March 2017]; D. Edward et al., “In the Matter of Article 50 of the
Treaty on European Union” (10 February 2017) at [44]–[55]
https://www.bindmans.com/uploads/files/documents/Final_Article_50_Opinion_10.2.17.pdf [Accessed 15 March
2017] and C. Streeten, “Putting the Toothpaste Back in the Tube: Can an Article 50 Notification Be Revoked?”, UK
Constitutional Law Blog (13 July 2016) https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ [Accessed 15 March 2017].
4. R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) and R (Miller and
another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. The case turned on the question whether the
Government is entitled, as a matter of domestic law, to give notice to withdraw from the EU without Parliament’s
approval. The High Court held that the Government is not entitled to do so. The judgment was confirmed by the
Supreme Court.
5. Lord Pannick QC,Miller [2016], Transcript, CO/3281/2016 and CO/3809/2016 (13 October 2016), p.18,
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/20161013-all-day.pdf [Accessed 15 March 2017]. See
also Helen Mountfield QC, pp. 190–191 and Manjit Gill QC, Miller [2016], Transcript, CO/3281/2016 and
CO/3809/2016 (17 October 2016), p.47, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/20161017-
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General, who on behalf of the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU invited the court to proceed
on the basis that a notification is indeed irreversible.6 In its judgment delivered at first instance,
the High Court accepted these submissions and held that, once given, notice to leave “will
inevitably result in the complete withdrawal of the United Kingdom from membership of the
European Union”.7 On appeal, the Supreme Court proceeded on the same assumption without,
however, formally deciding the matter.8 The European Commission has taken a more ambivalent
stance. In response to a written question tabled in the European Parliament, Commission
President Jean-Claude Juncker stated that “[t]he Treaty does not provide a mechanism for a
unilateral withdrawal of a notification under Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union
(TEU). Once the article 50 TEU is triggered, it is no longer a unilateral process.”9 This merely
confirms what is already evident—that the Treaty does not contain a mechanism for revoking a
withdrawal notification and that, once initiated, the withdrawal process is not completely unilateral
in character—without taking a position on the question of revocability.
The uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of art.50 TEU has significant implications
for Brexit and beyond. The idea that Britain’s notification to leave the EU is irreversible has
appealed to those who seek to shield the outcome of the Brexit referendum from future legal and
all-day.pdf [Accessed 15 March 2017].
6. Jeremy Wright QC, Miller [2016], Transcript (17 October 2016), p.64. See also Written Case of the
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, UKSC 2016/196 (18 November 2016) at [17].
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570778/Supreme_Court_Printe
d_Case_of_the_Secretary_of_State_for_Exiting_the_European_Union.PDF [Accessed 15 March 2017].
Government ministers have adopted the same position in public. See B. Kentish, “Brexit is ‘irrevocable’ once
Government triggers Article 50, Lord Chancellor Liz Truss says”, Independent (19 February 2017)
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/liz-truss-brexit-irrevocable-article-50-european-union-andrew-
marr-show-justice-secretary-a7588106.html [Accessed 15 March 2017].
7. Miller [2016] at [11]. In separate proceedings, the Belfast High Court appeared to adopt the same position
in Re McCord’s Application [2016] NIQB 85 at [23]. In support of this position, see J.V. Louis, “Le Droit de Retrait de
l’Union Européenne” (2006) 42 Cahiers de Droit Européen 293, p.308. See also Jake Rylatt, “The Irrevocability of an
Article 50 Notification: Lex Specialis and the Irrelevance of the Purported Customary Right to Unilaterally Revoke”
(27 July 2016) https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ [Accessed 15 March 2017].
8. Miller [2017] at [26] and [104]. See also Lord Reed (dissenting) at [169]. The claimants shared the
Government’s position on this point: see e.g. Miller [2016], Transcript, CO/3281/2016 and CO/3809/2016, pp.18
and 190–191 (13 October 2016) https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/20161013-all-day.pdf
[Accessed 15 March 2017].
9. Answer given by President Juncker on behalf of the Commission, Parliamentary Question, P-008603/2016
(17 January 2017).
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political challenge.10 By arguing that withdrawal is inevitable once notice has been given,
proponents of Brexit rely on art.50 TEU to ensure that the referendum result cannot be overturned
should the British public change its mind. Meanwhile, the view that the withdrawal notice may be
revoked has appealed to those who prefer to keep the door to Britain’s continued EU membership
open for as long as possible. Should it be possible to reverse the notice, the UK could reject the
outcome of the withdrawal negotiations in favour of remaining a member of the Union after all.
The British Government has ruled out this option at present.11 However, should its position
change, President Donald Tusk has suggested that it would be “acceptable for all European
partners” if Britain were to retract its notice to leave.12 Whilst some Member States have signalled
that they would indeed accept such a change of heart,13 it is by no means a foregone conclusion
that all Member States would follow suit.
Amidst the political upheaval caused by Brexit in the UK and across Europe, the need for
legal certainty is paramount. The question therefore remains: is a withdrawing Member State free
to rescind its notification to leave the Union under art.50 TEU or is it obliged by the Treaties to
follow its original decision through to its ultimate, though potentially no longer desired,
conclusion? The purpose of this article is to answer this question by clarifying the position of the
law. This task is complicated by several factors. The method of legal interpretation adopted by the
Court of Justice of the European Union is dynamic and formulated at a high level of generality.14
These features make it difficult to replicate with confidence in specific cases.15 In the present
context, this difficulty is compounded by the fact that no institutional and judicial precedents exist
to guide the interpretation of art.50 TEU and that the main interpretative task in this respect is to
resolve a question on which that provision is silent. Hampered by these difficulties, much of the
10. E.g. J. Rees-Mogg, HC Deb 7 February 2017, vol. 621, col. 281; D. Davis, HC Deb 24 January 2017, vol.
620, col. 171.
11. J. Wright QC, Miller [2016], Transcript (17 October 2016), p.64 (“as a matter of firm policy, once given a
notification will not in fact be withdrawn”).
12. D. Tusk, Keynote Address (13 October 2017).
13. J. Watts, “Britons can still reverse Brexit after Article 50 and say ‘we love you’ to EU, Luxembourg PM
says”, Independent (9 March 2017) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-article-50-xavier-
bettel-i-love-you-theresa-may-a7621091.html [Accessed 15 March 2017]
14. E.g. inDa Costa (28 to 30-62) ECLI:EU:C:1963:6, p.38, the Court declared that the meaning of the Treaties
has to be deduced from their “wording and spirit”.
15. G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), pp.274–275.
© Aurel Sari 5/32
discussion of art.50 TEU has been impressionistic and laden with policy considerations.16
Under these circumstances, recourse to the rules of interpretation set out in art.31 and
art.32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 may facilitate a more systematic
analysis of art.50 TEU.17 To be clear, the interpretation of art.50 TEU is first and foremost a matter
of EU law and I am not suggesting that the VCLT prevails over the rules of interpretation
applicable under EU law. Rather, I am advancing three points. First, it is permissible to have
recourse to the VCLT in the present context, bearing in mind the close affinity between the two
interpretative frameworks, the dual legal character of the Treaties and the fact that art.50 TEU is
concerned with terminating treaty relationships between the Member States. Second, interpreting
art.50 TEU with reference to the “categories of arguments”18 listed in art.31 and art.32 VCLT
permits a more rigorous analysis of the subject than appeals to policy considerations do.19 Third,
the rules of interpretation laid down in the VCLT apply without prejudice to any relevant rules of
EU law.20 This means that in the interpretation of art.50 TEU, the relative weight given to the
elements listed in art.31 and art.32 VCLT can, in fact must, be adjusted to reflect the cannons of
interpretation developed in EU law. Accordingly, in this paper, I propose to interpret art.50 TEU
with reference to its terms, context, the object and purpose of the Treaties, other relevant rules of
international law and supplementary rules of interpretation, as understood in art.31 and art.32
VCLT, but give weight to these different categories of arguments in line with the interpretative
method developed by the Court of Justice. The analysis demonstrates that a Member State
withdrawing from the EU pursuant to art.50 TEU is entitled to revoke its notification to leave.
Article 50 TEU: regulating the right to withdraw
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, neither the TEU nor the EC Treaty contained
16. Cf. Craig, “Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts” (2016), pp.464–465; Tridimas, “Article 50: An Endgame without
an End?” (2016), pp.303–305.
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 (23 May 1969).
18. The term is borrowed from J. Bengoextea, L. Moral Soriano and N. McCormick, “Integration and Integrity
in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice”, in G. de Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler (eds), The European
Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 43, p.57. Categories of arguments refers to “what has to be
looked at” during the process of interpretation.
19. Cf. S. Smismans, “About the Revocability of Withdrawal: Why the EU (Law) Interpretation of Article 50
Matters”, UK Constitutional Law Blog (29 November 2016) https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ [Accessed 15 March
2017]
20. Art.5 VCLT.
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a provision regulating the withdrawal of a Member State from the Union in express terms. Opinion
was divided whether or not the Member States retained the right to leave. This division mirrored
a broader disagreement about the true nature of the EU. Authors stressing the supranational
features of the Union tended to argue that any supposed right to withdraw was incompatible with
the permanent and irreversible character of European integration, as reflected in the general
scheme and specific provisions of the Treaties.21 In particular, the fact that the Treaties were
concluded for an “unlimited period”22 was widely understood to exclude the right of unilateral
withdrawal.23 However, even the European Court of Justice had to concede that the unlimited
duration of the Community did not preclude the Member States from amending the Treaties so as
to expressly permit the repatriation of competences and, by necessary implication, the complete
termination of their membership.24 Authors mindful of the international law origins of the EU
legal order were willing to go further and accept the possibility of withdrawal on the basis of the
relevant rules of international law,25 above all by common agreement of all Member States as
foreseen in art.54(b) VCLT.26 In its decision on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the
German Federal Constitutional Court took an even more assertive attitude and seemed to
contemplate the possibility that a Member State could withdraw from the Treaties even by way of
21. E.g. J.A. Hill, ‘The European Economic Community: The Right of Member State Withdrawal” (1982) 12
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 335, pp.354–357; U. Everling, “Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft noch Herren der Verträge? Zum Verhältnis von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und
Völkerrecht”, in R. Bernhardt et. al. (eds) Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte:
Festschrift für Hermann Mosler (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 1983) 173.
22. Art.356 TFEU and art.53 TEU.
23. E.g. M. Akehurst, “Withdrawal from International Organisations” (1979) 32 Current Legal Problems 143,
pp.150–152; J.H.H. Weiler, “Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization: The Case of the
European Economic Community” (1985) 20 Israel Law Review 282, pp.284–287; M. Pechstein and C. Koenig, Die
Europäische Union, 3rd edn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), p.233. See also N. Feinberg, “Unilateral Withdrawal from
an International Organization”, (1963) 39 British Yearbook of International Law 189.
24. Commission v France (7/71) ECLI:EU:C:1971:121 at [19]–[20].
25. E.g. A. Puttler, “Sind die Mitgliedstaaten noch ‘Herren’ der EU? Stellung und Einfluss der Mitgliedstaaten
nach dem Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrages der Regierungskonferenz” (2004) 39 Europarecht 669, p.676; S. Berglund,
“Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of Withdrawal from the European Union” (2006) 29 Scandinavian
Political Studies 147, pp.150–151; N. A. Jaekel, “Das Recht des Austritts aus der Europäischen Union – zugleich zur
Neuregelung des Austrittsrechts gem. Art. 50 EUV in der Fassung des Vertrages von Lissabon” (2010) 32 Jura 87,
pp.87–88.
26. For a critical review of these arguments, see Wyrozumska, “Article 50” (2013), pp.1395–1402; M. Ludewig,
Beendigungstatbestände als notwendige und dynamische Elemente der Mitgliedschaft in internationalen Organisationen unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung von Art. 50 EUV (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Land, 2015), pp.156–171.
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a unilateral act.27 However, these conflicting approaches were never conclusively resolved.
Whatever the position may have been before the Treaty of Lisbon, the right of unilateral
withdrawal is now enshrined in art.50 TEU. The purpose of that clause is twofold. First, it
recognises in express terms that the Member States are entitled to leave the Union, thereby putting
to rest any lingering doubts about the existence of such a right.28 In doing so, it also confirms that
the Union is not an insoluble compact based on a permanent and irreversible transfer of sovereign
powers.29 This has led some commentators to portray art.50 TEU as a regressive step and question
its compatibility with the traditional character of the Treaties.30 An alternative assessment places
art.50 TEU into a more positive light. By acknowledging that the Member States may leave the
Union, the Lisbon Treaty pulls the rug from under the feet of those who claim that membership
of the Union must inescapably lead to a European super-State and to the extinction of national
sovereignty.31 By not exercising their right to withdraw, the Member States in effect constantly
reaffirm and legitimise their membership of the EU.
Second, art.50 TEU defines the procedure to be followed in the event of withdrawal. This
procedure provides a fixed reference point among the tide of legal uncertainty that the exercise of
the right to withdraw is set to unleash. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that the EU
institutions and the Member States have limited means at their disposal to compel another Member
State to remain a member of the Union against its will.32 If exit cannot be prevented,33 at least it
can be regulated. As Jean-Claude Piris has suggested, art.50 TEU therefore may be understood as
a “sort of ‘facilitating’ mechanism” for resolving otherwise irreconcilable differences between a
27. Maastricht, BVerfGE 89, 155, p.190.
28. The pre-Lisbon debate is of limited relevance to the interpretation of art.50 TEU. See also Miller [2016] at
[56].
29. Cf. Costa v E.N.E.L (Case 6-64) ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, pp.593–594; Lisbon, BVerfG, 30 June 2009, 2 BvE
2/08 at [329]. See J.-P. Piris, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), p.130.
30. J. Schwarze, “The Convention’s Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (2003) 40
C.M.L.Rev. 1037, p.1040; T. Bruha and C. Nowak, “Recht auf Austritt aus der Europäischen Union? Anmerkungen
zu Artikel 1-59 des Entwurfs eines Vertrages über eine Verfassung für Europa” (2004) 42 Archiv des Völkerrechts 1,
pp.8–17; J. Zeh, “Recht auf Austritt” (2004) 7 Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 173, p.204. See also Herbst,
“Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaties’?” (2005) 6
German Law Journal 1755, pp.1758–1759.
31. A. von Bogdandy, “Founding Principles”, in A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.) Principles of European
Constitutional Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 11, p.52.
32. T.C. Hartley, Constitutional Problems of the European Union (Oxford: Hart, 1999), pp.164–165.
33. Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403, pp.2412–2422.
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Member State and the Union.34 Pursuant to art.50(2) TEU, a Member State wishing to withdraw
must notify the European Council of its intention. Following that notification, the European
Council provides guidelines to the Council for negotiating and concluding an agreement between
the Union and the withdrawing Member State. The agreement sets out the detailed arrangements
for withdrawal. Under art.50(3) TEU, the Treaties cease to apply to the withdrawing Member State
in one of three ways: upon the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement; failing that, two years
after the withdrawal notification was made; or upon the expiry of any extension period
unanimously decided by the European Council in agreement with the withdrawing Member State.
This framework imposes only limited substantive and procedural conditions on the
withdrawing Member State. Once it has given notice under art.50(1) TEU in accordance with its
own constitutional requirements, in essence, all that the withdrawing Member State is required to
do before the Treaties cease to apply is to wait out the two-year period stipulated in art.50(2)
TEU.35 It is not required to justify its decision to leave.36 Nor does art.50(2) TEU impose an
express duty upon it to negotiate and conclude a withdrawal agreement with the Union.37 At the
most, the withdrawing Member State may be under an implied duty to negotiate such an agreement
pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation,38 but this principle certainly does not oblige it to
actually conclude an agreement with the EU.39 In fact, art.50(3) provides that the conclusion and
34. Piris, Constitution for Europe (2006), p.129. In greater detail, see Ludewig, Beendigungstatbestände (2015),
pp.311–326. See also Puttler, “Sind die Mitgliedstaaten noch ‘Herren’ der EU?” (2004), p.678.
35. Zeh, “Recht auf Austritt” (2004), p.200; A. Tatham, “‘Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!’
EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon”, in A. Biondi, p.Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon
(Oxford: Oxford University 2012) 128, p.152; C. Hillion, “Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European
Union”, in D. Chalmers and A. Arnull (eds) The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University,
2015) 126, p.139.
36. Lisbon, BVerfG (30 June 2009) at [330]. This is widely accepted, e.g. W. Meng, “EUV Artikel 50”, in H.
von der Groeben, J. Schwarze and A. Hatje (eds) Europäisches Unionsrecht, 7th edn (Baden-Baden, Nomos: 2015) at [5].
37. Whether it would be prudent to exit without a withdrawal agreement in place is a different matter. See
Tatham, “EU Accession and Withdrawal” (2012), p.149.
38. Art.4(3) TEU. Cf. Zeh, “Recht auf Austritt” (2004), p.199. On the principle generally, see M. Klamert,
The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
39. Bearing in mind that art.50(4) TEU excludes the withdrawing Member State from taking part in the
deliberations and decisions of the European Council and the Council, it cannot be subject to a legal duty to support
the Union’s negotiation position either during the negotiating process or as formulated in any draft agreement. Rather,
art.50(4) TEU entitles the withdrawing Member State to pursue its own national interest. It follows that the
withdrawing Member State must be free to decide whether or not to conclude a withdrawal agreement. See also Thiele,
“Der Austritt aus der EU” (2016), pp.295–297.
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entry into force of a withdrawal agreement is not a necessary precondition for the withdrawal
notice to take effect. The right to leave is therefore overwhelmingly unilateral in character.40 This
has attracted considerable criticism. Commentators have deplored the fact that art.50 TEU does
not require the withdrawing Member State and the Union to make a final attempt to resolve their
differences in order to avoid the loss of membership.41 They have also expressed concern that the
lack of more robust procedural safeguards opens the door to political brinkmanship and provides
insufficient guidance on how to complete the withdrawal process.42
Amongst other things, art.50 TEU remains silent as to whether the withdrawing Member
State may retract its notification to leave. Does this silence mean that such a right cannot be
implied? Some think so. According to the authors of a widely read comment on the subject,
accepting an implied power to retract would amount to “reading such a right into a text from
which it is conspicuously absent”.43 This is of course true, but hardly a compelling argument. It is
in the nature of reasoning by way of implication that terms are read into the text from which they
are absent. Yet reasoning by implication is a well-established method of legal interpretation in
general and of European law more specifically.44 In fact, it is fair to say that the European Court
of Justice has made something of a name for itself by employing precisely this technique in its
jurisprudence.45 For instance, the initial silence of the Treaties on the subject of fundamental rights
and the effect of customary international law in the EU legal order does not mean that respect for
fundamental rights and customary international law could not have been a principle of EU law.46
40. Cf. Tridimas, “Article 50: An Endgame without an End?” (2016), p.301.
41. R.J. Friel, “Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft
European Constitution” (2004) 53 I.C.L.Q. 407, p.426; Thiele, “Der Austritt aus der EU” (2016), pp.295–296.
42. Schwarze, “The Convention’s Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (2003), p.1041; Friel,
“Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawal” (2004), p.426; Herbst, “Observations on the Right to
Withdraw” (2005), pp.1758; J.P. Terhechte, “Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Grundlegende Verfassungsurkunde der
europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft oder technischer Änderungsvertrag?” (2008) 43 Europarecht 143, pp.152–153; H.
Hofmeister “‘Should I Stay or Should I Go?’—A Critical Analysis of the Right to Withdraw from the EU” (2010) 16
European Law Journal 589, pp.593–595; Tatham, “EU Accession and Withdrawal” (2012), pp.151.
43. N. Barber, T. Hickman and J. King, “Pulling the Article 50 ‘Trigger’: Parliament’s Indispensable Role”,
UK Constitutional Law Blog (27 June 2016) https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ [Accessed 15 March 2017]
44. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning (2002), pp.149–152. Cf. R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2nd edn
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.165–167.
45. One need not look further than Van Gend en Loos (26/62) ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 [1963] E.C.R. 1, p.12. For
another prominent example, see Commission v Council (ERTA) (22-70) ECLI:EU:C:1971:32 at [16].
46. Cf. Stauder (29-69) ECLI:EU:C:1969:57 at [7]; Poulsen and Diva Navigation (C-286/90) ECLI:EU:C:1992:453
at [9].
© Aurel Sari 10/32
InMiller, Lord Pannick also submitted that art.50 TEU must necessarily exclude the right
to retract a notification to leave because it makes “no mention of a power to withdraw”.47 This
argument misunderstands the legal character of European integration and puts the cart before the
horse. The binding force of the Treaties depends on the consent of the Member States.48
Competences not conferred upon the EU remain with the Member States.49 Consequently, given
that art.50 TEU recognises the right of a Member State to withdraw its consent to be bound by
the Treaties, the exercise of that right can be subject only to those conditions which are either
expressly stipulated in art.50 TEU or which derive from other relevant provisions of the Treaties
by necessary implication. Put differently, the burden of proof is not on the withdrawing Member
State to demonstrate that it has the legal capacity to retract its notification to leave in the exercise
of its right of withdrawal, but it is for those who argue that it lacks this capacity to demonstrate
that art.50 TEU or the Treaties actually exclude it.
In conclusion, the fact that art.50 TEU makes no express provision for reversing a
withdrawal notification does not exclude the possibility that such a power may either be implied
in art.50 TEU or that a Member State could derive that power from general international law and
exercise it within the context of art.50 TEU, provided that doing so is compatible with its other
obligations under the Treaties. Whether or not a withdrawing Member State is entitled to reverse
its notice to leave is therefore a question to be resolved through the interpretation of art.50 TEU.
The applicable rules of interpretation
It is a central tenet of the EU’s legal catechism that the founding Treaties of the European legal
order are more than just ordinary international agreements. As the Court of Justice has explained
in Opinion 1/91, in contrast to common international agreements which merely create reciprocal
rights and obligations and do not provide for a transfer of sovereign rights, “the EEC Treaty, albeit
concluded in the form of an international agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional
charter of a Community based on the rule of law.”50 The TEU therefore has a dual legal character.
It is an international agreement in origin and from, yet at the same time also the “basic
constitutional charter”51 of a Union which itself “constitutes a new legal order of international
47. Lord Pannick QC, Miller [2016], Transcript (13 October 2016), p.16.
48. Art.54 TEU and art.357 TFEU.
49. Art.4(1) and 5(2) TEU.
50. European Economic Area (Opinion 1/91) ECLI:EU:C:1991:490 at [21].
51. Les Verts (294/83) ECLI:EU:C:1986:166 at [23].
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law”.52 This duality means that the interpretation of art.50 TEU is governed EU law, but that the
law of treaties remains relevant, in principle, too. The choice between the European interpretative
method and the VCLT regime is not a strictly binary one.
The rules of international law governing the interpretation of treaties are set out in art.31
and art.32 VCLT.53 It is widely understood that these provisions reflect customary international
law.54 They are applied as such both by the Court of Justice55 and by national courts,56 including in
circumstances where the VCLT is not formally applicable.57 Pursuant to art.31(1) VCLT
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.
Art.31(3) VCLT stipulates that account must also be taken in certain circumstances of subsequent
agreements and practice, as well as any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties. Art.32 VCLT determines when recourse may be had to supplementary means
of interpretation, including the preparatory work of a treaty.
Since the TEU is an international agreement, its operation is subject to the customary
rules of the law of treaties as reflected in the VCLT.58 As a matter of international law, the
52. Van Gend en Loos (26/62), p.12.
53. Generally, see U. Linderfalk, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007); Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2015); A. Aust,
Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.230–255; R. Kolb, The Law
of Treaties: An Introduction (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), pp.128–165.
54. Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) [1991] ICJ Reports 69 at [48] and, more recently,
Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgement (17 March 2016) at [35]. See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2015), pp.13–20.
55. E.g. Commission v Finland (C-118/07) ECLI:EU:C:2009:715 at [39]; Firma Brita GmbH (C-386/08)
ECLI:EU:C:2010:91 at [43]; Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón, Demirkan (C-221/11) ECLI:EU:C:2013:237 at [53];
Europäische Schule München (C-464/13 and C-465/13) ECLI:EU:C:2015:163 at [36]–[38].
56. E.g. Gold Reserve Inc v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela [2016] EWHC 153 Comm at [21]. See also Bahamas Oil
Refining Company International Limited v The Owners of the Cape Bari Tankschiffahrts GmbH & Co KG (Bahamas) [2016] UKPC
20 at [17].
57. Cf. Anson v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2015] UKSC 44 at [54]; Axel Walz (C-63/09)
ECLI:EU:C:2010:251 at [22]–[23].
58. This point has been recognized by the Court of Justice on successive occasions: cf. Commission v Italy (Radio
Valves) (10/61) ECLI:EU:C:1962:2 [1962] C.M.L.R. 187, pp.197–198; Opel Austria GmbH (T-115/94)
ECLI:EU:T:1997:3 at [89]–[94]; ThyssenKrupp Nirosta GmbH (C-352/09 P) ECLI:EU:C:2011:191 at [45]; Commission v
Portugal (C-62/98) ECLI:EU:C:2000:358 at [44]; Commission v Slovak Republic (C-264/09) ECLI:EU:C:2011:580 at [41].
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interpretation of art.50 TEU is therefore governed by the rules set out in art.31 and art.32 VCLT.59
However, as is well known, the Court of Justice has developed its own distinct approach to the
interpretation of the founding Treaties,60 focusing on the “spirit, the general scheme and the
wording” of the texts.61 As the Court held in CILFIT
every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted
in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard being had to
the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the
provision in question is to be applied.62
Although reminiscent of the general rule of interpretation laid down in art.31 VCLT, the Court’s
approach gives greater emphasis to the object and purpose of the Treaties63 compared to what the
VCLT regime warrants.64 In addition, the Court tends to be reluctant in taking account of relevant
See also Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen, X and TBG (C-24/12 and C-27/12) ECLI:EU:C:2014:1385 at [21].
59. This follows from the customary status of these provisions. But see H. Kutscher, Methods of Interpretation
as seen by a Judge at the Court of Justice (Luxembourg: Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1976), p.31.
60. Among the classic studies on the subject, see P. Pescatore, “Les Objectifs de la Communauté Européenne
comme Principes d’Interprétation dans la Jurisprudence de la Cour De Justice”, in Miscellanea W.J. Ganshof van der
Meersch, Volume 2 (Bruylant: Brussels, 1972) 325; F. Dumon, The Case-law of the Court of Justice: A Critical Examination of
the Methods of Interpretation (Luxembourg: Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1976); A. Bredimas, Methods
of Interpretation of Community Law (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1978) and J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the
European Court of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). For a more recent study, see Conway, Limits of Legal Reasoning
(2002).
61. Van Gend en Loos (26/62), p.12.
62. CILFIT (283/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:335 at [20]. See also Kutscher, Methods of Interpretation (1976), pp.5–6.
63. D. Verwey, The European Community, the European Union and the International Law of Treaties (The Hague:
T.M.C Asser Press, 2004), pp.221–235; A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp.611–614; Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2015), pp.121–122. See also P.J. Kuijper, “The
European Courts and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing Story”, in E. Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties Beyond the
Vienna Convention (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 256, pp.258–269.
64. Cf. Opinion of A.G. Cosmas, Wijsenbeek (C-378/97) ECLI:EU:C:1999:144 at [53]; Opinion of A.G.
Jääskinen,Hengartner and Gasser (C-70/09) ECLI:EU:C:2010:289 at [44]–[45]. See also Bredimas,Methods of Interpretation
of Community Law (1978), pp.178–179; P.J. Kuijper, “The Court and the Tribunal of the EC and the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 1969” (1998) 25 Legal Issues of European Integration 1, pp.2–4; J. Odermatt, “The Use of
International Treaty Law by the Court of Justice of the European Union” (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European
Legal Studies 121, pp.130–134.
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instruments65 and subsequent practice,66 contrary to art.31(2) and (3) VCLT. Traditionally, it also
makes more limited use of the supplementary means of interpretation under art.32 VCLT.67
Although marked differences exist between the Court’s own interpretative approach and
the relevant rules of the VCLT, these differences should not be overestimated.68 As various studies
have shown, the Court’s interpretative method combines textual, contextual and dynamic
elements.69 This broadly corresponds to the main categories of arguments listed in art.31 VCLT.
The affinity between the two interpretative frameworks is confirmed by the Court’s case-law. The
Court accepts that it is bound by art.31 and art.32 VCLT in the interpretation of agreements
concluded by the EU with third parties. In some cases, the comparison of third party agreements
with the founding Treaties has led it to apply the VCLT rules to the latter. In Opinion 1/91, it
recalled that the terms of a treaty must be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose and
proceeded to compare the respective contexts and objectives of the Agreement on the European
Economic Area and the EEC Treaty.70 In other cases, the Court found that the terms of third
party agreements carry the same meaning as identical terms used in the EC Treaty.71 This line of
65. E.g. Opinion of A.G. Cosmas,Wijsenbeek (C-378/97) at [50]–[54]; Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro, Sweden
v Commission (C-64/05 P) ECLI:EU:C:2007:433 at [34]. But see Manjit Kaur (C-192/99) ECLI:EU:C:2001:106 at [24].
66. France v Commission (C-327/91) ECLI:EU:C:1994:305 at [36]. See also Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, Commission
v Council (Convention on Nuclear Safety) (C-29/99) ECLI:EU:C:2001:680 at [147].
67. Opinion of A.G. Mayras, Reyners (C-2/74) ECLI:EU:C:1974:59 [1974] E.C.R. 657, p.666. See Arnull, Court
of Justice (2006), pp.614–615.
68. Cf. N. Fennelly, “Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice” (1996) 20 Fordham International
Law Journal 665, pp.668–672; J.I. Charney, “Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?”
(1998) 271 Recueil des Cours 101, p.183. Bengoextea, Moral Soriano and McCormick, “Integration and Integrity in the
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” (2001), p.48 go as far as to suggest that there is nothing
“particularly European about the way the ECJ proceeds to justify its decisions”.
69. E.g. R.-M. Chevallier, “Methods and Reasoning of the European Court in Its Interpretation of Community
Law” (1964) 2 C.M.L.Rev. 21; Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation of Community Law (1978), pp.33–105; Bengoetxea, The
Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (1983), pp.233–262; A. A. Llorens, “The European Court of Justice, More
than a Teleological Court” (1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 373, pp.374–383; Bengoextea, Moral
Soriano and McCormick, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” (2001),
p.57; G. Itzcovich, “The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice” (2012) 10 German Law
Journal 537; K. Lenaerts and J. A. Gutiérrez-Fons, “To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and
the European Court of Justice” (2012) EUI Working Papers EL 2013/9.
70. European Economic Area (Opinion 1/91) at [14]–[21]. See also Kupferberg (104/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:362 at
[23]–[26]; Metalsa (C-312/91) ECLI:EU:C:1993:279 at [10]–[16]; Demirkan (C-221/11) ECLI:EU:C:2013:583 at [47]–
[48].
71. Pabst & Richarz KG (Case 17/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:129 at [26]–[27]; Legros (C-163/90)
© Aurel Sari 14/32
jurisprudence confirms that the rules of interpretation set out in art.31 and art.32 VCLT are
applicable, in principle, to the founding Treaties and that they may produce the same outcome as
the Court’s own interpretative approach.72 In Levin, the Court of Justice went further and applied
the general rule of interpretation laid down in art.31(1) VCLT to the EC Treaty directly.73
In the present context, recourse to the interpretative scheme set out in art.31 and art.32
VCLT in order to aid the interpretation of art.50 TEU under EU law is warranted for two reasons.
First, it must be borne in mind that art.50 TEU is concerned with regulating a Member State’s
withdrawal from the Treaties. Like accession, ratification and revision,74 the process of withdrawal
brings to the fore the international law origin and form of the Treaties.75 In Miller, the British
Government submitted that notification to leave the EU is “an administrative step on the
international law plane” governed by the principles of international law.76 Although not persuaded
by the Government’s overall argument, the Supreme Court did agree that art.50 TEU “operates
on the plane of international law”.77 Second, interpreting art.50 TEU with reference to the VCLT
permits a more robust analysis than attempting to second guess the Court. Professor Stijn
Smismans’ call for an “EU (interest) interpretation” of art.50 TEU illustrates the point.78 Smismans
assumes that art.50 TEU leaves the withdrawing Member State in a weaker bargaining position
than the remaining Member States. From this, he deduces that art.50 TEU must have been
intended to favour the interests of the remaining Member States. If follows, in his view, that the
withdrawing Member State cannot benefit from a unilateral right to revoke its withdrawal
notification. In short, a unilateral right to revoke cannot exist as this would not serve the interests
ECLI:EU:C:1992:326 at [23]–[27]; Texaco A/S (C-114/95 and C-115/95) ECLI:EU:C:1997:371 at [28]–[32]; Jany (C-
268/99) ECLI:EU:C:2001:616 at [35]–[39].
72. In this respect, it should be recalled that the institutions, including the Court, are bound as a matter of
customary international law to apply the rules of interpretation set out in the VCLT to agreements concluded between
the EU and third parties. Applying different rules to such agreements could potentially result in a breach of the EU’s
international obligations. Consequently, whenever the Court extends the meaning given to a term found in the Treaties
to a similar or identical term found in a third party agreement, the Court can only do so on the assumption that its
own interpretative approach leads to the same outcome as the application of art.31 and art.32 VCLT—or else it would
be applying its distinct interpretative method to the third party agreement in breach of customary international law.
73. Levin (53/81) ECLI:EU:C:1982:105 at [9].
74. Arts 48, 49 and 54 TEU.
75. Cf. Commission v Malta (C-508/08) ECLI:EU:C:2010:392 at [56].
76. Detailed Grounds of Resistance on Behalf of the Secretary of State, C0/3809/2016; C0/3281/2016 (2
September 2016) at [8].
77. Miller [2017] at [69].
78. Smismans, “About the Revocability of Withdrawal” (29 November 2016).
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of the EU. Adopting “une certaine idée de l’Europe”79 as the leitmotif of interpretation allows policy
considerations to masquerade as legal analysis all too easily. This is neither compelling nor, unless
it comes from the Court of Justice itself, authoritative. Under these circumstances, art.31 and art.32
VCLT provide a more robust analytical framework that permits the different aspects of art.50
TEU to be assessed systematically. Accordingly, in the section below I will review the terms and
context of art.50 TEU, the object and purpose of the Treaties, other relevant rules of international
law and the relevant preparatory works. Once again, it is important to underline that this analysis
is designed to assist the interpretation of art.50 TEU as a matter of EU law, not to displace it.
The interpretation of Article 50 TEU
As noted earlier, art.50 TEU is silent on the reversibility of a withdrawal notification issued by a
Member State. The task therefore is to determine whether the power to retract a notification is
implied in art.50 TEU or, if it not, whether the TEU prevents a Member State from deriving such
a power under general international law, assuming such a power exists, and exercising it in the
context of art.50 TEU.
The terms of Article 50 TEU
Read in isolation, there is nothing in the wording of art.50 TEU to imply that a Member State may
revoke its notification to leave the EU. Neither the language nor the substantive or procedural
aspects of the provision compel that conclusion. However, it has been suggested that the terms of
art.50 are incompatible with revoking a notification to leave and therefore must exclude such a
power. According to Lord Pannick QC, “the very possibility of a power to withdraw a notification
would frustrate…Article 50(3), which sets out in the clearest possible terms, what the
consequences are of giving the notification under Article 50(2).”80 This argument is based on two
false assumptions.
The first assumption is that, once set in motion, the process laid out in art.50 TEU must
inevitably end in terminating the applicability of the Treaties to the withdrawing Member State and
the loss of its EU membership.81 But this overlooks the fact that the withdrawal process does not
actually have to reach its ultimate conclusion. The withdrawing Member State’s departure from
79. P. Pescatore, “The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community Law” (1983) 8 E.L. Rev.
155, p.157.
80. Lord Pannick QC, Miller [2016], Transcript (13 October 2016), pp.16–17.
81. Lord Pannick QC, Miller [2016], Transcript (18 October 2016), p.58.
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the EU does not depend on the conclusion of a withdrawal agreement.82 As we saw, art.50(3) TEU
stipulates that the withdrawal becomes effective two years after the notification to leave was given,
should a withdrawal agreement not materialise before that date. However, this two-year period
may be extended by the European Council acting with the agreement of the withdrawing Member
State. This extension is not subject to any conditions. Consequently, the two sides may agree to
extend the two-year period repeatedly and for any length of time before the notification takes
effect.83 Given that the withdrawal notification could be suspended indefinitely by common
agreement,84 the procedure laid down in art.50(3) TEU does not, as a matter of principle, have to
end in the Member State’s departure from the Union. Whether or not the Member States are likely
to agree to such an indefinite suspension is immaterial. The point is that art.50(3) TEU does not
compel the parties to pursue the withdrawal process to its ultimate conclusion.
The second assumption is that a power to retract would frustrate the process set out in
art.50(3) TEU. This is a non sequitur. The process in art.50(3) TEU is set in motion when a
Member State issues a notification to withdraw under art.50(2) TEU. It is important to underline
that it is this notification, and not any other act, which terminates the applicability of the Treaties.
In particular, the Member State’s withdrawal from the Treaties does not depend on the conclusion
of a withdrawal agreement. At any rate, it is questionable whether an agreement between the
withdrawing Member State and the EU would be capable of terminating the applicability of the
Treaties to the withdrawing Member State at all.85 This is so because the EU itself is not a party to
the TEU and TFEU. Consequently, the process set out in art.50(3) TEU is entirely procedural in
character: it provides for a delay of two years, or longer if an extension period is put in place,
before the withdrawal notification becomes effective.86 Contrary to what Lord Pannick QC
82. This is widely accepted, e.g. C. Calliess, “Art. 50 EUV”, in C. Calliess and M. Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV
Kommentar: Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta, 5th edn (München, Beck: 2016)
at [5]. Interpretations to the contrary are unconvincing, as they contradict the plain language of art.50(3) TEU. See A.
Łazowski, “Withdrawal from the European Union and Alternatives to Membership” (2012) 37 E.L. Rev. 523, pp.526–
528.
83. See also A. Łazowski, “Unilateral Withdrawal from the EU: Realistic Scenario or a Folly?” (2016) 23
Journal of European Public Policy 1294, p.1296. But see Louis, “Le Droit de Retrait” (2006), p.308.
84. This point suggests that the withdrawal process could be terminated by common agreement. However, this
does not answer the original question whether the withdrawing may Member State terminate the process unilaterally.
85. Bruha and Nowak, “Recht auf Austritt” (2004), p.7; O. Dörr, “Art. 5 [Austritt aus der Union]”, in E.
Grabitz, M. Hilf and M. Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der Europäischen Union: EUV/AEUV (München: Beck, 2016),
p.5.
86. Such delays are a common feature of the procedures governing the withdrawal of States from international
organisations. See D. Marie-Claude, “Le retrait des membres des Organisations internationales de la famille des
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suggests, a power to revoke the notification would not frustrate the legal consequences attached
to it by art.50(3) TEU, since the only legal consequence that art.50(3) TEU imposes on the
withdrawing Member State is this two-year delay before its notification takes effect. The only thing
that a power to revoke would frustrate is the withdrawal notification itself. But this merely points
the inquiry back at the original question: can a Member State unilaterally retract its notice to leave
the EU? It is certainly not good enough to reply that it is not permissible to retract a notification
because doing so would amount to retracting the notification.87
Consequently, there is nothing in the language of art.50 TEU, read on its own terms,
which necessarily implies the existence of power to reverse the withdrawal notification, but there
is nothing in that language which excludes this power either.
The context
The right to leave the EU does not exist in a normative vacuum. The terms of art.50 TEU have to
be interpreted within their context or, to use the terminology preferred by the Court of Justice,
with regard to the “whole scheme” of the TEU.88 Context for these purposes includes the entire
text of the TEU and the TFEU,89 including their preambles and annexes, as well as the declarations
annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of
Lisbon.90
The right to withdraw from the EU sits uneasily with certain provisions of the Treaties.
The preambles of both the TEU and the TFEU recall the Member States’ determination to create
an “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The preamble of the TEU also records
Nations Unies” (1994) 40 Annuaire français de droit international 106, pp.114–115.
87. As a matter of international law, a State may commit itself to a certain course of action by way of a unilateral
declaration. Whether or not a State has in fact undertaken a unilateral legal commitment “all depends on the intention
of the State in question”, as the International Court of Justice pointed out in Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina
Faso v Republic of Mali) [1986] ICJ Reports 573 at [39]. This is not particularly helpful in the present context. It suggests
that a withdrawing Member State could commit itself not to reverse its withdrawal notification if it is clear that it
intended to commit itself in this manner. However, this does not clarify whether the terms of art.50 TEU otherwise
permit a Member State to retract its notification to leave.
88. Commission v Council (ERTA) (22-70) at [15].
89. Although separate instruments, the TEU and TFEU have the same legal value and jointly constitute the
foundation of the EU (art.1 TEU and art.1(1) TFEU). It is preferable to consider them as each other’s context within
the meaning of art.31(2)(a) VCLT. Treating them as a single treaty within the definition of art.2(1)(a) VCLT would
fail to acknowledge their distinct existence, while treating them as “relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties” within the meaning of art.31(3)(c) VCLT would fail to express their close relationship.
90. Art.31(2)(b) VCLT. See Manjit Kaur (C-192/99) at [24].
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their resolve to “mark a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the
establishment of the European Communities”. Art.1 TEU repeats these principles, and thus
underlines their significance, by declaring that “[t]his Treaty marks a new stage in the process of
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. This statement indicates that the
overall objective of the TEU is to serve as a framework for the process of ever closer European
integration. The unlimited duration of the Treaties suggests that membership in this process is
meant to be permanent.91 Clearly, the introduction of a unilateral right to withdraw from the EU
is difficult to reconcile with the preferred course and lasting nature of European integration.
Other provisions of the TEU point in a different direction, however. The Treaty of
Lisbon has given pride of place to the principle of conferral. The principle confirms that the Union
must act within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States and that
competences not conferred upon the EU remain with the Member States.92 Declaration 18
appended to the Lisbon Treaty recalls these points and adds that it is for the Member States to
adjust the scope of the competences conferred upon the EU. What emerges from these provisions
is that the Union’s legal capacities are based on the consent of its Member States and that the
authority to increase or decrease their scope, often described as Kompetenz-Kompetenz, remains firmly
within the hands of national governments. These constitutional principles are further confirmed
by art.48 TEU, which requires ratification or approval by all Member States of any amendments
made to the Treaties before they can enter into effect.93Art.50 TEU takes the principles of consent
and conferral to their logical conclusion by expressly confirming the right of the Member States
to unilaterally extract themselves from the applicability of the Treaties and thereby regain the right
to exercise their sovereign powers in full.
At first sight, the provisions of the Treaties calling for closer integration, coupled with the
duty of sincere cooperation,94 might suggest that art.50 TEU should be interpreted in a restrictive
manner. For instance, it has been argued that a withdrawing Member State is bound by the Union’s
values, as defined in art.2 TEU, with regard to the modalities of its exit from the EU.95 This is
unobjectionable as a statement of general principle. However, neither the values listed in art.2 TEU
nor other general principles of EU law may impose additional substantive or procedural conditions
91. Art.53 TEU and art.356 TFEU.
92. Art.4(1) and art.5(2) TEU.
93. Art.48(4) and (6) TEU.
94. Art.4(3) TEU.
95. Tatham, “EU Accession and Withdrawal” (2012), pp.148–149.
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on the exercise of the right to leave which would contradict its unilateral character.96 This is so
because the right to leave in essence amounts to a right to repudiate the principle of closer
integration proclaimed in art.1 TEU. As the English Court of Appeal held in Shindler:
a decision by a Member State to withdraw from the EU is an exercise of national
sovereignty of a special kind for which the TEU has made the express provision
that this may be done in accordance with a Member State’s own constitutional
requirements.97
While a withdrawing Member State remains bound by the Treaties until its notice to leave takes
effect, it would contradict the language and purpose of art.50 to rely on other provisions of the
Treaties to impose conditions on the withdrawing Member State beyond those expressly
mentioned in art.50 TEU. For example, it is a step too far to suggest that the principle of respect
for democracy found in art.2 TEU requires a Member State to hold a successful referendum before
it may give notice to leave pursuant to art.50(1) TEU.98 Such a precondition contradicts the TEU’s
deference to the withdrawing Member State’s own constitutional requirements.99 The right to leave
the EU is not merely an exception to the commitment to closer integration which, like all
exceptions, must be interpreted narrowly.100 Rather, it expresses a Member State’s right to
completely negate the consent that hitherto sustained its commitment to ever closer union.
The foregoing assessment has significant implications for the reversibility of the notice to
withdraw. The analysis of the wording of art.50 TEU has revealed that its immediate purpose is to
confirm in express terms that the Member States are entitled to leave the EU and to lay down the
procedure governing the exercise of that right. When interpreted in its context, it emerges that the
broader purpose of art.50 TEU within the general scheme of the Treaties is to permit the principles
of consent and conferral to supersede the overall objective of ever closer union. The significance
of this point is twofold. First, it confirms that the unilateral character of the right to leave the EU
is a manifestation of State sovereignty.101 Since the legal effect of the withdrawal notification
96. See also Shindler v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster [2016] EWCA Civ 469 at [14].
97. Shindler [2016] EWCA Civ 469 at [16].
98. Tatham, “EU Accession and Withdrawal” (2012), p.149.
99. Lisbon, BVerfG (30 June 2009) at [330]. Besides, it takes some dubious legal alchemy to distil a requirement
so specific as a referendum from a value so general as respect for democracy.
100. This point is overlooked by Zeh, “Recht auf Austritt” (2004), pp.207–209. Cf. Hofmeister “‘Should I Stay
or Should I Go?’” (2010), pp.595–597.
101. As the German Federal Constitutional Court put it, “right to withdraw underlines the Member States’
sovereignty”, Lisbon, BVerfG (30 June 2009) at [329].
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derives from the sovereign will of the withdrawing Member State, it stands to reason that the
Member State concerned may extinguish the notification before it takes effect through a contrary
expression of its will. Put differently, if the Treaties accept that a Member State is sufficiently
sovereign to withdraw from the process of ever closer union by way of a unilateral act, they must
also accept that it is sufficiently sovereign to retract that act before it takes effect. Second, it
confirms that it would be inappropriate to interpret the right to withdraw in a way that subjects its
exercise to additional substantive or procedural conditions not imposed by art.50 TEU. While it is
a settled principle that the effectiveness of the Treaties cannot be “defeated by unilateral provisions
of Member States”,102 in the present context it is the effectiveness of art.50 TEU itself which would
be defeated if additional conditions were imposed upon the unilateral exercise of the withdrawing
Member State’s will.103 Other applicable rules of EU law, including the general principles of
European law, may inform how the withdrawal process should be conducted, but they cannot alter
the scope of the right to withdraw. Accordingly, the context of art.50 TEU strongly suggests that
its terms must be interpreted to imply, or in any event not to exclude, the right to retract a
withdrawal notification.
Object and purpose
Identifying the object and purpose of an international agreement is a notoriously difficult and
elusive task.104 In the present instance, the case-law of the Court of Justice offers some welcome
assistance. The Court of Justice has on numerous occasions compared the object and purpose of
the EC Treaty with the object and purpose of other international agreements. For this purpose,
the Court typically draws on the preamble, aims and key terms of the agreements concerned.105
With regard to the EC Treaty, the Court has found that its aim is “the establishment of a common
market involving the elimination of all obstacles to trade in order to merge the national markets
into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal
102. Reyners (2-74) ECLI:EU:C:1974:68 at [50].
103. Cf. H. Lauterpacht, “Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of
Treaties” (1949) 26 British Yearbook of International Law 48.
104. See J. Klabbers, “Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties” (1997) 8 Finnish Yearbook
of International Law 138; I. Buffard and K. Zemanek, “The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ (1998) 3
Austrian Review of International and European Law 311.
105. E.g. Legros (C-163/90) at [24]; Barkoci and Malik (C-257/99) ECLI:EU:C:2001:491 at [53]; Gloszczuk (C-
63/99) ECLI:EU:C:2001:488 at [50]. See also IATA (C-344/04) ECLI:EU:C:2006:10 at [41] and Intertanko (308/06)
ECLI:EU:C:2008:312 at [54]-[65].
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market”.106 In Opinion 1/91, the Court declared in more general terms that the Treaty aims “to
achieve economic integration leading to the establishment of an internal market and economic and
monetary union”.107
As we saw earlier, its preamble and art.1 suggest that the overall objective of the TEU is
to serve as a framework for ever closer union. Specifically, the TEU marks a new stage in the
process of European integration by building upon the establishment of the European Community
and extending the reach of integration into new areas. The preamble repeatedly emphasises the
determination of the Member States to strengthen their collaboration, including by “deepen[ing]
the solidarity between their peoples”, “achiev[ing] the strengthening and the convergence of their
economies”, “reinforcing the European identity” and “establishing an area of freedom, security
and justice”. Accordingly, the object and purpose of the TEU can be defined as the establishment
of the European Union, on which the Member States have conferred certain competences,108 in
order to create an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,109 in particular by promoting
peace, the Union’s values and the well-being of its peoples; establishing an area of freedom, security
and justice without internal frontiers; establishing an internal market; promoting economic, social
and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States; and upholding and promoting the
Union’s values and interests in its relations with the wider world.110
It is in the nature of a unilateral right to withdraw that it contradicts the overall object and
purpose of the TEU. However, the same cannot be said about the power to reverse a notification
to withdraw. Recognising that a Member State may change its mind not only gives effect to the
principles of consent and conferral, but it also provides the withdrawing Member State with an
opportunity to restore its commitment to the process of European integration. Affording the
Member State with such an opportunity is particularly important given that art.50 TEU does not
require the parties to resolve their differences in an attempt to avoid the loss of membership. By
contrast, denying that a Member State may change its mind renders its exit from the EU a foregone
conclusion, unless the European Council agrees to suspend the withdrawal process indefinitely.
Accordingly, interpreted in the light of the object and purpose of the Treaties, the terms of art.50
TEU must be understood as implying the power to revoke a notification to withdraw. Only this
interpretation is compatible both with the purpose of art.50 TEU and with the object and purpose
106. Metalsa (C-312/91) at [15].
107. European Economic Area (Opinion 1/91) at [17].
108. Art.1 TEU.
109. Cf. Pescatore, “Les Objectifs de la Communauté Européenne” (1972), pp.351–360.
110. Cf. art.2 TEU.
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of the TEU as a whole, while denying the existence of a power to revoke a withdrawal notification
contradicts both.
Other relevant rules of international law
Pursuant to art.31(3)(c) VCLT, account must be taken in the interpretation of the TEU of “any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”. In the present
context, the relevance of this rule is reinforced by the principle that the EU must respect
international law in the exercise of its powers.111 One of the aims of the Union is to contribute to
“the strict observance and the development of international law” in its relations with the wider
world.112 The institutions are therefore bound to observe international law in its entirety when they
adopt legal acts under the Treaties.113 Secondary acts of EU law adopted in breach of the applicable
rules of international law may be annulled by the Court.114 Different considerations apply to the
founding Treaties, however. Treaty rules generally prevail over rules of customary international
law.115 Moreover, since the founding Treaties are constitutional in character, the Court has ruled
that obligations imposed by other international agreements cannot prejudice their core
principles.116 It follows from these points that a Member State cannot rely on customary or
conventional rules of international law in order to justify revoking its withdrawal notification
should this be incompatible with art.50 TEU. However, we have found that the such a power is
compatible with art.50 TEU and must be implied in its terms. Consequently, if international law
were to recognise that parties to a treaty may retract notifications of withdrawal, this power would
not only have to be taken into account in the interpretation and application of art.50 TEU, but it
could also be adduced as an “additional basis” for the obligations incumbent upon the Member
States and the institutions to accept the reversal of a withdrawal notification as a matter of EU
law.117As the analysis below shows, international law does recognize the existence of such a power.
According to art.68 VCLT, a “notification or instrument provided for in articles 65 or 67
may be revoked at any time before it takes effect”. While art.65 VCLT is not relevant in the present
111. Poulsen and Diva Navigation (C-286/90) at [9].
112. Art.3(5) TEU. See also art.21(1) and art.21(2)(b) TEU and art.214(2) TFEU.
113. Air Transport Association of America (C-366/10) ECLI:EU:C:2011:864 at [101].
114. Opel Austria GmbH ( T-115/94) at [90]–[94]; Racke (C-162/96) ECLI:EU:C:1998:293 at [45]–[57].
115. Institut de Droit International, “Problems Arising from a Succession of Codification Conventions on a
Particular Subject” (1995-I) 66 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 245, p.248. See also Amoco v Islamic Republic of
Iran (1988) 27 International Legal Materials 1316 at [112].
116. Kadi and Al Barakaat (C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) ECLI:EU:C:2008:461 at [285].
117. See Greece v Commission (C‑203/07 P) ECLI:EU:C:2008:606 at [64].
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context, art.67 VCLT declares that an act withdrawing from a treaty pursuant to its provisions
shall be carried out through an instrument communicated to the other parties. In the present
context, it follows from art.68 VCLT that a withdrawal notification issued in accordance with
art.50 TEU may be revoked at any time before it takes effect. However, this is not the end of the
analysis. Since not all Member States of the EU are parties to the Vienna Convention,118 art.68
VCLT is not applicable between all of them as a matter of treaty law. A cautious approach to
art.31(3)(c) VCLT suggests that art.68 VCLT should therefore only be taken into account in the
interpretation of art.50 TEU if it reflects customary international law.119 As the customary nature
of art.68 VCLT has not been authoritatively settled, it is necessary to briefly investigate this
question.
At first sight, the fact that art.68 VCLT is one of the procedural rules contained in Section
4 of Part V of the VCLT might suggest that it cannot be of a customary character. The rules in
Section 4 are widely considered to be examples of the progressive development of the law of
treaties rather than a codification of pre-existing customary rules.120However, unlike certain related
provisions, art.68 VCLT has not generated any significant disagreement within the International
Law Commission.121 It has attracted only few comments from governments122 and was eventually
adopted without a dissenting vote.123 The latter point in particular may indicate that it is customary
118. Two Member States, France and Romania, are not parties to the VCLT.
119. However, it should be emphasised that such an approach may be overly cautious and that a robust argument
may be made that the VCLT should be taken into account as a matter of treaty law. See C. Mclachlan, “The Principle
of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention” (2005) 54 I.C.L.Q. 279, pp.313–315. It has
been suggested by Smismans, “About the Revocability of Withdrawal” (29 November 2016) that art.68 VCLT is not
relevant in the present context, as it was not meant to apply to international organizations. This overlooks that the
VCLT is binding upon the vast majority of the Member States, that the Treaties are international agreements
concluded between the Member States and that art.5 VCLT specifically extends the applicability of the Convention
to treaties setting up international organizations.
120. E.g. 714th Meeting (4 July 1963), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963), Volume I, 280 at
[54]; 864th Meeting (6 June 1966), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Volume I(2), 148 at [65];
Czechoslovakia at 70th Meeting, Committee of the Whole (14 May 1968), in United Nations, Official Records of the United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session (New York: United Nations, 1969) 414 at [8]. See also Racke (C-
162/96) at [59] and the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, Racke (C-162/96) ECLI:EU:C:1997:582 at [96].
121. See 698th Meeting (12 June 1963), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963), Volume I, 163 at
[21]–[66]; 864th Meeting (6 June 1966) at [74]–[82].
122. Comments by Governments on the Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties drawn up by the Commission
at its Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Volume II, 279,
p.324 (Poland), p.341 (Sweden) and pp. 355–356 (United States of America).
123. The draft was adopted at diplomatic conference by 94 votes to none, with eight abstentions. See 28th
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in nature.124 Against this, it has been argued that the customary character of art.68 VCLT cannot
be divorced from the status of art.67 VCLT, given the intimate relationship between these two
provisions.125 To the extent that art.67(2) VCLT does not reflect custom, art.68 VCLT cannot
reflect custom either, or so the argument goes.126 This reasoning is misguided. Art.68 VCLT
defines its scope of application by referring to art.67 VCLT. However, this reference should not
be understood to imply that the power to revoke a withdrawal notification derives from the terms
of art.67 VCLT.127 As the drafting history of the VCLT demonstrates, that power derives directly
from the authority to withdraw from a treaty.
At one stage during the drafting process, the text of what later became the VCLT included,
in the form of draft art.38, a set of rules designed to regulate how treaties may be terminated
through the operation of their own provisions. Draft art.38(3)(a) declared that a treaty ceases to
apply to a party withdrawing from it in conformity with the terms of the treaty “as from the date
upon which the…withdrawal takes effect”.128 Eventually, the whole of draft art.38 was deleted129
as most of its terms were considered self-evident and therefore superfluous.130 A suggestion to
incorporate draft art.38(3)(a) into what is now art.67(2) VCLT was not followed up.131 Originally,
draft art.24, which subsequently evolved into art.67(2) VCLT, stipulated that a notice to withdraw
Plenary Meeting (16 May 1969), in United Nations, Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties,
Second Session (New York: United Nations, 1970) 153, p.157.
124. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion [1971] ICJ Reports 47 at [94].
125. A. Tzanakopoulos, “Article 68”, in O. Corten and P. Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 1564, p.1565.
126. Tzanakopoulos, “Article 68” (2011), p.1565. For a more favourable assessment of the customary nature
of art.68 VCLT, see H. Krieger, “Article 68”, in O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2012) 1173, p.1173.
127. In any event, the duty imposed by art.67(2) VCLT to give notice “through an instrument communicated
to all parties” is superseded, through the operation of art.5 VCLT, by the conflicting requirement of art.50(2) TEU to
address the notification to the European Council.
128. Draft Articles adopted by the Commission, A/CN.4/L.117 and Add.1 (7 January 1965), p.35.
129. 836th Meeting (21 January 1966), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Volume I(1), 91 at
[53].
130. Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur (15 November 1965),
in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), Volume II, 1, p.25; Report of the International Law Commission
covering the Work of its Fifteenth Session (6 May–12 July 1963), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966),
Volume II, 189, p.200.
131. 836th Meeting (21 January 1966), at [53]. Cf. 828th Meeting (11 January 1966), in Yearbook of the International
Law Commission (1966), Volume I(1), 36 at [76] and [82].
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had to specify the date upon which it was to take effect.132 However, this requirement too was
deleted as the provision was considered too elaborate and mostly self-evident.133 The revised
version of draft art.24 confined itself to making two fundamental points. Draft art.24(1) provided
that a notice to withdraw had to be communicated in a formal manner, while draft art.24(2)
declared that a notice could be revoked at any time before it took effect, unless the treaty provided
otherwise.134 Subsequently, draft art.24 was renumbered135 and split into two separate provisions.136
Draft art.24(1) became draft art.50 and then art.67(2) VCLT, while draft art.24(2) became draft
art.50 (bis) and finally art.68 VCLT.
The evolution of these provisions demonstrates the existence of a broad consensus within
the International Law Commission, shared by governments commenting on the drafts, that the
date upon which a notice to withdraw takes effect may be fixed either by the treaty itself or by the
withdrawing State, subject to the provisions of the treaty and possibly a duty to provide a minimum
period of notice.137 Provisions asserting this principle in express terms were omitted from the draft
text because they were considered to be self-evident. However, the principle is inherent in the
VCLT, including in art.54 VCLT. Pursuant to this article, a party may unilaterally withdraw from
a treaty either in conformity with its provisions under art.54(a) VCLT or at any time with the
consent of all parties under art.54(b) VCLT. This is significant for two reasons.
First, the authority to withdraw from a treaty in accordance with art.54 VCLT derives
from the party’s capacity to conclude treaties,138 which itself is an attribute of its sovereignty.139
This means that a party’s right to determine the date upon which its notice to withdraw will take
132. Art.24(1)(d), Second Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur (20
March, 10 April, 30 April and 5 June 1963), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963), Volume II, 36, p.86.
133. See the discussion in 698th Meeting (12 June 1963) at [20]–[66].
134. 714th Meeting (4 July 1963) at [10].
135. 720th Meeting, 11 July 1963, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963), Volume I, 314, p.328.
136. 864th Meeting (6 June 1966) at [51]–[82].
137. Second Report on the Law of Treaties by G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur (15 March 1957), in
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1957), Volume II, 16, p.34. To similar effect, see Opinion of the Legal
Adviser of the International Labour Office (17 August 1977), in United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1977), 248, pp.248–
250.
138. Art.6 VCLT. See Second Report on the Law of Treaties by G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur (15
March 1957), in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1957), Volume II, 16, p.34 and Second Report on the Law
of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock (1963), p.85. See also A. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1961), p.506.
139. S.S. Wimbledon [1923] PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 1, p.25. See also Separate Opinion of Judge El-Erian, Interpretation
of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion [1980] ICJ Reports 73, p.170.
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effect is based on its treaty-making capacity. This explains why the International Law
Commission’s commentary to the predecessor of art.68 VCLT declared that “the right to revoke
the notice is really implicit in the fact that it is not to become effective until a certain date”.140 Since
the right to set the date upon which a withdrawal notice becomes effective is based on the capacity
to conclude treaties, what the commentary really meant, as was pointed out during the drafting
process, was that “the right to revoke should be implicit in the power to give notice, unless the
treaty itself provided otherwise”.141 In the final analysis, the authority to revoke a notice to
withdraw from a treaty thus derives directly from the State’s capacity to make, and unmake, treaties.
Second, the status of art.68 VCLT is closely tied to that of art.54 VCLT. Since art.54 VCLT gives
effect to the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the capacity of States to conclude treaties,142 its
customary status is beyond doubt.143 Since art.68 VCLT in turn gives effect to art.54 VCLT, it too
reflects customary international law. This is confirmed by State practice144 and the practice of
international organisations,145 which accepts the reversibility of notifications to withdraw from a
treaty. It is worth highlighting that the High Court of South Africa recently ordered the President
and certain Ministers of the Republic of South Africa to revoke South Africa’s notification to
withdraw from the International Criminal Court despite the fact that, much like art.50 TEU, the
relevant provision of the Rome Statute is silent on revocability of a withdrawal notification.146 In
140. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1966), Volume II, 187, p.264. See also Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, in Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (1963), Volume II, 189, p.214.
141. 698th Meeting, 12 June 1963, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1963), Volume I, 136 at [33].
142. Art.6 and art.26 VCLT.
143. M.E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden Boston: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2009), p.689; V. Chapaux, “Article 54”, in Corten and Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions (2011) 1236, p.1237–
1241; T. Giegerich, “Article 54”, in Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2012) 945,
pp.948–949.
144. E.g. US Withdrawal of Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention (14 May 1966) in (1966) 54 Department
of State Bulletin 955; Letter Containing Notice of Withdrawal from the International Labour Organisation (5 November
1975) in (1975) 14 International Legal Materials 1582, pp.1582 and 1584. For more recent examples, see Gambia:
Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, UN Doc. C.N.62.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (10 February 2017); South
Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, UN Doc. C.N.121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (7 March 2017).
145. E.g. Consequences of the Withdrawal of a Member State, Report by the Director-General, UNESCO (8 January
l985), in United Nations Juridical Yearbook (1985) 156 at [16], [18] and [22]. See also E. Osieke, Constitutional Law and
Practice in the International Labour Organisation (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p.36 and H.G. Schermes and N.M.
Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity Within Diversity, 5th edn (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), pp.100–101.
146. Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others (Council for the Advancement of
the South African Constitution Intervening) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53 at [84]. Cf. art.127, Rome Statute of the International
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its submissions to the High Court, the South African Government specifically invoked art.68
VCLT in support of its power to revoke its notice to withdraw from the Rome Statute.147 This is
highly significant for our purposes, since South Africa is not a party to the VCLT and neither are
all members of the International Criminal Court.148 No party appears to have objected to the South
African reversal.
The customary status of art.68 VCLT has two implications in the present context. First,
art.68 VCLT has to be taken into account in the interpretation of art.50 TEU in accordance with
art.31(3)(c) VCLT. This duty is confirmed by the Court’s case-law, which stipulates that “EU law
must be read in the light of the relevant rules of international law”.149 Interpreting art.50 TEU in
the light of the customary rule expressed in art.68 VCLT strengthens our earlier conclusion that a
right to revoke is implicit in art.50 TEU. Second, the right to revoke a withdrawal notification
which the Member States enjoy under customary international law exists and applies in parallel to
the corresponding right that they derive from art.50 TEU.150 Since the EU and its institutions are
bound to respect relevant rules of customary international law in the exercise of their powers,151
they are under an obligation to give effect to this customary rule when they act in the context of
art.50 TEU. Consequently, customary international law constitutes a distinct and additional basis
for the obligations incumbent on the institutions and the other Member States under EU law to
accept a withdrawing Member State’s right to terminate the withdrawal process prematurely.152
Supplementary means of interpretation
Pursuant to art.32 VCLT, recourse may be had to the preparatory work of art.50 TEU in order to
confirm the interpretation that has emerged from the preceding analysis. While it must be recalled
that the Community courts have traditionally been reluctant to make extensive use of preparatory
works for the purposes of interpretation,153 relying on the travaux to confirm, rather than establish,
Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (17 July 1998).
147. Respondents’ Heads of Argument, Case No. 83145/2016 (5 and 6 December 2016) at [55].
148. This means that both the South African Government and the High Court accepted that art.68 VCLT
reflects customary international law.
149. Hungary v. Slovakia (C-364/10) ECLI:EU:C:2012:630 at [44].
150. Cf. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986]
ICJ Reports 14 at [179].
151. E.g. Air Transport Association of America (C-366/10) at [101].
152. See Greece v Commission (C‑203/07 P) at [64].
153. See Arnull, Court of Justice (2006), pp.614–615.
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the meaning of art.50 TEU should not raise any serious objections.154 All the more so, since the
EU courts have shown themselves more willing to rely on preparatory works more recently,155
thereby further narrowing the gap between their own interpretative approach and the VCLT.
The preparatory work of the intergovernmental conference which drew up the Treaty of
Lisbon is not in the public domain. However, art.50 TEU reproduces art.I-59 of the Draft Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe prepared by the European Convention,156 subject to certain
relatively limited modifications. The negotiating history of art.I-59 establishes that the right to
withdraw from the Union was intended to be unilateral in character. Amendments attempting to
tie this right to substantive conditions or to the successful conclusion of a withdrawal agreement
were rejected.157 As a note prepared by the Praesidium of the European Convention explained, “it
was felt that such an agreement should not constitute a condition for withdrawal so as not to void
the concept of voluntary withdrawal of its substance”.158 The Praesidium also recalled that the
“procedure laid down in this provision draws on the procedure in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.”159 The Member States clearly shared this desire to safeguard the voluntary and
unilateral character of the right to withdraw. It is worth noting that art.I-59(2) originally directed
the European Council to “examine” the notification issued by a Member State. This requirement
was rejected by the Member States and was not reproduced in art.I-60(2) of the Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe.
The significance of this preparatory work is that it fully confirms the interpretation and
conclusions reached earlier. Art.50 TEU was designed to expressly recognise that the Member
States enjoy a unilateral right to withdraw from the Treaties and to regulate the procedure
governing the exercise of this right in a way that does not detract from its essentially unilateral
154. Indeed, this reflects the way in which the Court of Justice is using travaux. See S. Miettinen and M.
Kettunen, “Travaux to the EU Treaties: Preparatory Work as a Source of EU Law” (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of
European Legal Studies 145.
155. E.g. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, Nawras Bolbol (C-31/09) ECLI:EU:C:2010:351 at [40]–[44]; Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami (T-18/10) ECLI:EU:T:2011:419 at [49]; Pringle (C-370/12) ECLI:EU:C:2012:756 at [135]. See S. Schonberg
and K. Frick “Finishing, Refining, Polishing: On the Use of Travaux Preparatoires as an Aid to the Interpretation of
Community Legislation”, (2003) 28 E.L. Rev. 149.
156. European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03 (18 July
2003).
157. For an overview of the different proposals, see Secretariat of the European Convention, Summary Sheet
of Proposals for Amendments concerning Union Membership: Draft Articles Relating to Title X of Part One (Articles
43 to 46), CONV 672/03 (14 April 2003), pp.10–12. See also Wyrozumska, “Article 50” (2013), pp.1402–1406.
158. Praesidium, Title X: Union Membership, CONV 648/03 (2 April 2003), p.9.
159. Praesidium, Title X: Union Membership (2 April 2003), p.9.
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nature. In particular, there is no evidence in the preparatory work to support the view that art.50
TEU was “deliberately designed” to avoid the possibility that a Member State may reverse its
withdrawal notification.160 Denying that possibility not only contradicts the expressly stated
intentions of the drafters, but also their admission that art.50 TEU draws upon the procedure set
out in the VCLT. In the absence of any indications to the contrary, it must be presumed that art.50
TEU was designed to be compatible with the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention,
including art.68 VCLT.
Assessment
All strands of the interpretation point in a single direction: a notice to withdraw from the EU is
reversible. Nothing in the Treaties and the negotiating history of art.50 TEU expressly or implicitly
denies the right to revoke a notice to leave the EU. On the contrary, the general scheme of the
Treaties, the object and purpose of the TEU, the applicable rules of customary international law
and the preparatory work confirm the existence of such a right. Given that the literal, historical
and teleological methods of interpretation161 produce the same result, the relative weight to be
accorded to the different categories of arguments reviewed in the preceding sections is of
secondary importance.
These findings raise two procedural questions. First, are there any formal requirements
that a Member State wishing to rescind its withdrawal notification must comply with? Revoking a
withdrawal notification is a formal treaty act. As such, it should be submitted in written form,162
just like the original notification itself. Since a withdrawing Member State is not bound to justify
its decision to leave the Union, it need not justify its decision to revoke the withdrawal notification
either, though in practice it might be expedient to offer an explanation.163 The notice should be
addressed to the European Council in its capacity as the recipient of the original notification under
art.50(2) TEU.
Second, is a Member State entitled to submit a second withdrawal notification after it has
revoked an earlier one? The text of art.50 TEU certainly does not preclude this. If a Member State
is entitled to change its mind once, there is no reason, in principle, why it should not be entitled
to do so twice. However, starting and stopping the withdrawal process on a repeated basis might
enable the Member State concerned to circumvent the procedural limits, in particular the two-year
160. Lord Pannick QC, Miller [2016], Transcript (13 October 2016), p.16.
161. Cf. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (T-18/10) at [40]; Mühlleitner (C‑190/11) ECLI:EU:C:2012:542 at [34].
162. To this effect, see 864th Meeting (6 June 1966) at [78].
163. See e.g. South Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal (7 March 2017).
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time period, laid down in art.50 TEU. Although it seems unlikely that a Member State would risk
the political fallout that such a course of action would entail, the potential for abuse does exist, at
least in theory. However, this is not a sufficient reason to call into question the right to revoke a
withdrawal notification itself.164 As I have shown, this right exists as a matter of law, independently
of policy considerations. Moreover, as already noted, the application of art.50 TEU is subject to
other rules, including the principle of sincere cooperation. Repeatedly initiating the withdrawal
process would disrupt the functioning of the EU and thus constitute a measure “which could
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives” within the meaning of art.4(3) TEU.165 It
follows that a Member State must refrain from such action. Moreover, to the extent that the
principle of sincere cooperation incorporates the principle of good faith,166 a Member State may
initiate and terminate the art.50 TEU process only with the genuine intention of leaving the EU
or retaining its membership, but not with the aim of achieving a negotiating advantage.167 Should
a Member State fail to comply with these principles, it may open itself up to infringement
proceedings under art.258 TFEU.
Conclusion
A systematic application of the rules governing the interpretation of the TEU yields a conclusion
free from any doubt and ambiguity: a Member State may revoke its notification to withdraw from
the EU made pursuant to art.50 TEU before it takes effect. This result confirms the position of
the Member States as the “masters of the Treaties”.168 The continued applicability of the Treaties
is predicated upon their continued consent. They may withdraw that consent by means of a
unilateral notice expressing their sovereign will. Due to its unilateral nature, they may also abandon
this decision by revoking their original notice to withdraw. A systematic interpretation also reveals
that the reversibility of a notice to leave gives effect not only to the principles of consent and
conferral, but also to the object and purpose of the TEU. In fact, recognising that a withdrawing
164. See also Craig, “Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts” (2016) at 464.
165. The specific obligation imposed by the principle of sincere cooperation depends on the particular context:
Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH (Case 78-70) ECLI:EU:C:1971:59 at [5].
166. Cf. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, Commission v Malta (C-508/08) ECLI:EU:C:2010:392 at [49]–[77]; Opinion
of A.G. Mazák, Greece v Commission (C‑203/07 P) ECLI:EU:C:2008:270 at [83]. See G. de Baere and T. Roes, “EU
Loyalty as Good Faith” (2015) 64 I.C.L.Q. 829, pp.837–855.
167. See also D. Edward et al., “In the Matter of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union” at [58]–[59];
Eeckhout and Frantziou, “Brexit and Article 50 TEU: A Constitutionalist Reading”, pp.40–41.
168. Lisbon, BVerfG (30 June 2009) at [298].
© Aurel Sari 31/32
Member State may revoke its notification is the only interpretation of art.50 TEU that is capable
of reconciling respect for the sovereignty of the Member States with the objective of “ever closer
union”.
This conclusion contradicts the decision of the High Court in Miller that once a Member
States gives notice to withdraw, its exit from the EU is inevitable.169 It is unfortunate that the High
Court did not benefit from more detailed submissions on this point. It is also unfortunate that it
accepted the parties’ submissions without assessing their strength. Had it done so, it should have
realized that they are not tenable. Even more regrettable is the fact that the Supreme Court decided
to base its judgment on the assumption that a withdrawal notification may be reversed.170 Whether
the Supreme Court was entitled to proceed in this way is open to question.171 In principle, a national
court is not bound to investigate a point of EU law on its own motion where the parties have
excluded that point from the ambit of their dispute.172 Nor is a national court bound to refer a
question of EU law to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under art.267 TFEU if that
question has no bearing on the outcome of the case before it.173 These principles would have
entitled the Supreme Court to refrain from deciding the reversibility issue, or from referring it to
the Court of Justice, had it declared that question to be irrelevant to the proceedings and left it
there. This is not, however, what the Supreme Court did. Instead of simply dismissing the question,
it proceeded on the assumption that the notice to leave is irrevocable.174 While its pronouncements
on this point therefore carry no more authority than an untested assumption, it is questionable
whether it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to venture even this far, rather than studiously
refraining from taking any view on the matter whatsoever, considering the question in full on its
own motion or deferring it to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. One unfortunate
consequence of the Supreme Court’s half-hearted position was to create the impression, in some
minds, that it did in fact rule that a withdrawal notice made under art.50 TEU is irrevocable.175
Ultimately, it is for the Court of Justice of the European Union to provide an authoritative
interpretation of art.50 TEU. Proceedings have been initiated before the Irish courts to obtain
169. Miller [2016] at [11].
170. Miller [2017] at [26].
171. Cf. A. Miglio, “Of courts, politics, and EU law: the UK Supreme Court’s failure to refer and its
consequences”, SIDI Blog (30 January 2017) http://www.sidiblog.org/2017/01/30/of-courts-politics-and-eu-law-
the-uk-supreme-courts-failure-to-refer-and-its-consequences/ [Accessed 15 March 2017]
172. Van Schijndel and van Veen (C-430/93 and C-431/93) ECLI:EU:C:1995:441 at [21]–[22].
173. CILFIT (283/81) at [10].
174. Miller [2017] at [26].
175. E.g. Sir Oliver Letwin, HC Deb 31 January 2017, Vol. 620, col. 870.
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such a ruling by way of the preliminary reference procedure.176 As I have shown in this paper, a
systematic analysis of art.50 TEU leaves no doubt about its meaning. In fact, a strong case can be
made that in this instance the “correct application of [EU] law [is] so obvious as to leave no scope
for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved”.177 The
fact that it takes a sustained effort to arrive at the correct meaning of art.50 TEU does not mean
that it falls short of this requirement. What matters is not the extent or complexity of the task of
interpretation, but whether or not it is capable of arriving at a result that is so obvious as to leave
no scope for reasonable doubt.178 A national court would be perfectly entitled to conclude that a
withdrawal notification issued under art.50 TEU is revocable even without having to refer this
question to the Court of Justice. However, national courts against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law would have to be satisfied that “the matter is equally obvious
to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice.”179 Whilst this test does not
require complete uniformity at the national level, the court of one Member State is unlikely to clear
this hurdle where conflicting decisions have been adopted by the courts of other Member States.180
Consequently, the fact that the Supreme Court of the UK has assumed that a withdrawal
notification is not revocable means that national courts of last instance in other Member States are
on safer ground if they refer this question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. In any
event, given that only the Court of Justice can provide an authoritative interpretation of art.50
TEU that applies across all Member States, including to the UK, it would be more appropriate if
national courts at any level were to submit this question to the Court of Justice under the
preliminary ruling procedure. That would provide a welcome measure of legal certainty and could
open up new avenues for political debate currently closed off by an untenable interpretation of
art.50 TEU that has prevailed in the English courts.
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